This essay is part of the book Philanthropy: Voluntary Action for the Public Good, by Robert L. Payton. It was originally presented to a group of college and university presidents of the nation's most complex system of higher education as part of "Year 2000: A Colloquium on the Major Policy Directions for Higher Education in New York," sponsored by the Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York, Tarrytown House Executive Conference Center, Tarrytown, NY, September 15, 1986.

I know from personal experience that the tensions between "public" and "private" are serious, and at times flare up in controversy. Foundations (corporate and independent) have an undetermined role to play as mediators, agitators, advocates, reactors, and diplomats. I have left the perspective unaltered—at the time I presented the essay, I was president of Exxon Education Foundation. Including this essay here is in no way intended to reflect the present views of my former colleagues.

Donald Gaudion, then CEO of Sybron Corporation and chairman of the board of the University of Rochester, spoke to an informal meeting of this organization about a dozen years ago.

He said that he liked to affect an academic style when he met with his corporate board, and a corporate style when he met with academics. That way he managed to keep both groups uncomfortable, annoyed—and attentive.

Speaking to us in the early 1970s, Gaudion said that the major point he would make is that different times call for different styles of management. In a growth economy, managers have to be risk-takers, innovators, experimenters. In a "mature" economy, on the other hand, managers have to be able to concentrate on cost-cutting, efficiency, productivity.

We were then in a "mature" industry. Gaudion advised us that in his industry, under such circumstances, the emphasis was on "eliminating bleeder products."

Higher education has been a mature industry in New York for a very long time. Enrollment has been soft; the demographic trends have ranged from just bearable to downright disheartening. The great expectations of the 1960s were deflated within a decade.

It was at about that time that the Board of Regents created a commission on "the financially troubled institution" in higher education. We examined a great mass of material and concluded that many public and private colleges and universities could be said to be in trouble. And, although we informally referred to ourselves as "the euthanasia committee," we discovered that generalizations were very difficult to apply to specific institutions.

When I came to Exxon Education Foundation a decade ago, I gradually came to understand that foundation work is the application of practical wisdom, gleaned from long experience in testing theory against practice. I brought with me some convictions that were based largely on my experience in higher education in New York. Fortunately, being in higher education in New York means being in the midst of one of the richest and most diverse systems of higher education anywhere in the world.

One conviction that I brought with me to Exxon Education Foundation was that Donald Gaudion was right: Different conditions require different kinds of presidential behavior. In some periods we most need the vision and enthusiasm of leadership, while in others we need the tough-minded and tightly focused values of management. Few people are switch-hitters, able with equal dexterity to perform both as leaders and as managers interchangeably, as circumstances require. Most of us have personalities that limit our adaptability. We tend to overstate our ability to function well in situations we find unpleasant, dull, or beyond our competence—just as our critics tend to understate that ability.

One responsibility of foundations is that they must pass judgment on the characters and abilities of the people with whom they deal. That means passing judgment on whether the institution is well led and well managed.

A second conviction that I brought into foundation work from my experience in higher education in New York was that individual institutions have a great deal to say about their own destinies. Service on the "euthanasia committee" convinced me of that, and observing the extraordinary will to survive of a number of colleges facing disaster since then confirms that it is dangerous to go into mourning while the patient is still alive. Some colleges are willing to live in a permanent condition of struggle; in some depressed regions of the country, these institutions are a symbol of hope. Whatever the averages and trends may imply, individual institutions can often find a way to counter them.

David Riesman once advised me that a foundation involved with higher education should invest in individuals rather than in institutions. Because of the power of leadership, he said, some of the most interesting and promising new developments in higher education emerge in some of the most unlikely places. Individual presidents and deans are the most important people in the developmental life of a college or university; they know how to enlist and utilize the talent that is available.

I then learned that talented and interesting people often move from one place to another, and take their charisma with them. Leadership is not enough.

We have long operated on the conviction that we must try to direct our funds toward good ideas in the hands of capable people supported by their central administration. I have had no reason to change that view—to believe that we can focus only on the idea, the person, or the institution and neglect the other variables.

Ten years ago it seemed evident that a common problem facing higher education was the disorder surrounding general education. That judgment seems in retrospect to have been well founded. Since then, almost 70% of all colleges and universities report that they have been engaged in reviewing and often reforming their programs of general education.

General education is a complex world of its own. To have an interest in it means more than encouraging debates of educational philosophy. Foundations may wish, to encourage efforts to strengthen general education, but colleges—and especially universities—are ill-designed for that purpose. The goals of higher education are driven primarily by forces rooted in the disciplines and the professions, and to challenge that structure is often to invite frustration if not failure.

Foundations must choose specific aspects of general education, as the Sloan Foundation has done so well with its program on technology and as Exxon Education Foundation has attempted to do with its support of foreign language teaching and learning. Much as Sloan discovered with the rising interest in re-thinking the place of science and technology in general education, we found a decade ago there was promise of a national revival of interest in foreign language study after a dismal decade of abandonment and know-nothing rejection. The presidential task force known as the Perkins Commission seemed to signal a renewed interest and commitment.

(At the same time, people in foundations as well as people on campuses know all too well that the field of foreign language study is notoriously fragmented and fractious.)

In foreign language and in other fields, we also learned another very important lesson: that it was not sufficient to work with individual scholars and institutions. Because of the structure of the university and the conflict between specialized fields and general education, we have found that working closely with educational organizations and associations is increasingly necessary to pursue the objectives of our foundation.

In addition to general education, the methodology of teaching and learning, and the management of higher education, we have encouraged efforts to cut across the barriers that have balkanized the campus. Integrative studies, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies, and international studies have all been prominent in our thinking.

It occurred to me that we might be most helpful to you in sketching out the strategies we follow as well as where we think our future emphasis will fall and the kinds of priorities that we think will emerge. How do we mesh our strategies with yours? How do we relate strategic planning in education to strategic planning in philanthropy?

Foundations and corporations such as those represented here today have achieved prominence for two reasons, it seems to me: They have philanthropic investment strategies; they set patterns that individual givers can follow. Because these foundations are staffed by professionals, so-called, they are able to develop strategies, to consider numerous alternative opportunities, and to monitor results.

The very word strategy implies a long-term perspective. Strategizing tends to diminish emotional influences. Individuals often respond to relief efforts intended to reduce suffering, but foundations and corporations do not. The Ethiopian famine is a good example, and the immediate response to the survivors of the volcanic eruption in Cameroon is another. Strategic philanthropy aims at understanding the underlying causes of those terrible problems in terms of the social and political as well as the natural forces at work.

Education is a long-term process, one that should require strategic thinking. Donald Gaudion, at the ACUSNY discussion I mentioned earlier, spoke of the "product cycle" in his industry (medical and dental equipment). The time from the first development of a product until a decision to drop it, he said, was a span of just three years. When he looked at the development of curricula and degree programs in a university, on the other hand, the time frame seemed vastly longer, and there seemed to be no point where a decision could be made to eliminate anything.

Educational philanthropy has three choices: It can focus on the immediate alleviation of problems resulting from falling enrollments and budget deficits; it can commit its resources to sustaining what is already functioning and functioning well, and make grants in support of base budgets and incremental improvements; or it can focus on root causes and seek to influence long-term change.