The Ethics of Corporate Grantmaking
Part 2 of 3
First, even those who are
morally sensitive and well-disciplined benefit from the review of principles and
the discussion of cases. Second, the ethical implications of new practices may
not be self-evident, and discussion will bring that out. Third, the process
itself will strengthen the moral dimension of the corporate structure. Fourth,
even those without a reliable moral compass can benefit from a reliable map of
the territory.
In the face of uncertainty,
the greatest anxiety is felt by those whose personal habits are rule-bound, or
who work in a corporate setting that leaves little to individual judgment (or
both). At one level of the organization there may be great insistence on
following the rules to the letter; at another level there may be rich rewards
for those who know what to do when the rules no longer apply—or, more commonly,
when the rules remain but no longer mean what they meant before. Following rules
often leads to bad results because the meaning of the rules has changed while
the form has remained the same. Letting rules determine behavior is also often
seen as praiseworthy in a junior executive and as a weakness in a senior
executive.
The way out of ethical
confusion will not be found in rules. We have entered a period where we may be
called upon to fashion a new ethics, a new understanding of the consensus
concerning what is ethical and unethical. The sources of ethics and morality are
to be found in custom and usage as those reflect the externalized values of the
community and the internalized values of individual behavior. We can expect
ethical norms to change as community values change, reminding ourselves that
values don't change monolithically or uniformly. "Openness" and "accountability"
were more generally applauded in the 1970s than in the 1980s. The "tolerance"
praised in some circles as sensitive consideration of the rights of others may
be considered by others to be the reflection of an empty and spineless
relativism.[1] And, if tolerance of
other people's values has increased in many ways, there is much resistance in
some others. Most religious leaders argue that religious values should permeate
our lives, and not be relegated to ritual observance on weekends. Many corporate
leaders consider the influence of organized religion out of place in the
business corporation, and worry about personal values supplanting corporate
ones.
To address the complex and
uneasy relationship of religious and secular values in corporate philanthropy
would require another essay. The matter is extremely sensitive as well as
complicated. Even so, religion and philanthropy are so interwoven in the
American tradition that I am convinced the tensions should be discussed and
clarified rather than avoided and ignored.
The question here is whether
the values of corporate grantmaking are changing, putting more emphasis on the
benefits to the donor and less on the needs of the recipient. if they are, is
that an ethical issue? For example, when someone advocates that grants to
nonprofit organizations be used as a means of increasing corporate profits, one
of the questions that must be asked is whether that is an ethical matter as well
as an operational and organizational change. It may be argued that it is a
different strategy to achieve the same ends—or that it is simply adding a second
end to the first one, or making the whole process more efficient. If it is an
ethical change, what do we mean by that? If the answer is given that the
result will be more money flowing through nonprofits to increasing numbers of
people in need, that will reflect one approach to ethics. If the answer is given
that the moral rules of philanthropy and the practices of marketing are
incompatible, that will reflect another approach. A third approach may be that
we have to balance rules and results in the way that is most "responsible."
Almost all ethical problems
are complex, not simple. Many problems have an ethical dimension, and in some
cases the ethical consideration will govern the solution-the ethical aspect will
determine the choice among the available alternatives.
But it is wise to remember
that not all problems are ethical problems, and that the ethical consideration
should not always be conclusive. Leaping to ethical conclusions is as risky as
leaping to financial or manufacturing conclusions. On the other hand, more
business problems arise from neglecting the ethical dimension than from putting
too much emphasis on it.
Thinking About Ethics
Grantmakers make grants or
reject them, or recommend to others that grants be made or not. Grantmakers are
agents, actors, and making a grant is an act. Grantmakers as well as
others often ask whether a grant should be made or not; some grants are
not automatic (although many are: consider matching gifts, for example). Asking
that sort of question involves a spectator or commentator. It is a
level of reflection one step higher than that involved in the act itself.
At a third level there is a
different sort of question that is asked, and this is what philosophers
do (amateurs and capital-P philosophers alike). According to the British moral
philosopher Bernard Mayo (from whom I borrow this analysis), moral philosophers
ask:
• Why do we do
what is right?
• Why should we do what is right?
• How do we know what is right?
Mayo adds a fourth question
to these "three fundamental questions" for moral philosophy:[2]
• What do we mean by
'right'?
To which I will add a fifth,
of fundamental importance to corporate grantmaking (that we will come back to
later):
• Who do we mean by
'we'?
We could also add, in
parentheses after "right" in each of those questions: "(or wrong)."
I would also add, adapting a
suggestion from a philosopher who is a writer and corporate consultant on
business ethics, three other questions that are particularly germane to
corporate grantmakers: A grant is thought to be:
• Good (or bad) for
whom?
• Good (or bad)
when?
• Good (or bad) by what
standard?[3]
For example, "Will a grant
to a private voluntary agency engaged in development in Central America be
helpful to that organization?" is one way of asking the first question. A
different way of asking the question would be to ask, "Will we be criticized for
making a grant in a country where we have very little business interest?" The
question of whether the grant will help the people most directly affected by it
in Central America may never be asked at all. The question of timing may be
crucial. A grant for a chemistry laboratory may not be considered timely if the
donor is a chemical company being sued for illness following the use of a toxic
chemical. The third question—by what standard—might come up with a grant for
research that includes pressure to redirect the research away from the original
objective. That would be thought to violate an accepted grantmaking practice.
(Are corporate strings on research support any different from, government
strings? What do we mean by "strings," anyway?)
In thinking about notions of
good and bad, right and wrong, students of law have been more persistent in
studying the underside of their domain than have moral philosophers. Criminology
is a fat and affluent field. There are not only books about it, there are
courses, even degrees. I know of no courses or degrees in immorality.
I have a great many books
about ethics and morality. I have very few that confront the unethical
and immoral as their main theme. There are some important exceptions, of
course: Ronald Milo has published a book entitled Immorality.[4] Sissela Bok has written a
bestseller with the title Lying.[5] There is a reawakened
interest among moral philosophers in Aristotle's notion of akrasia—"weakness of
will"—the failure to behave morally even when we know the right thing to do.[6]
This is as good a time as
any to point out that ethics and morality can mean (a) theory and practice, or
(b) the externally imposed and the internalized.[7] "The two words, once
fully synonymous ... have now so divided their functions that neither is
superfluous ... ethics is the science of morals, and morals are
the practice of ethics."[8] The distinctions are
useful to philosophers, but in my opinion common usage now considers the two
terms to be interchangeable.
(This digression may also be
a good time to argue that references to "business ethics" are misleading;
ethical problems characteristic of life in large complex organizations do not
differ in important ways among business corporations, government agencies,
universities, even religious organizations. It is moral life in the
organization that is the common factor.)

[1] Cf.
Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, Simon and Schuster, 1987,
pp. 141ff. Back to Text]
[2] Bernard
Mayo, The Philosophy of Right and Wrong, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986,
pp. 8-9. [Back to Text]
[5] Sissela
Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, Pantheon Books,
1978.[Back to Text]
[6] Cf. the
essays by M. F. Burnyeat and David Wiggins in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Essays
on Aristotle's Ethics, University of California Press, 1980.[Back
to Text]
[7] Erik
Erikson offers still another distinction in Insight and Responsibility
(Norton, 1964) when he speaks of moral rules as based on "a fear of threats
to be forestalled," and ethical rules to be based on "ideals to be striven for
(p. 222). [Back to Text]
[8] H. Ward
Fowler, Modem English Usage, 2nd ed., edited by Sir Ernest Gowers,
Oxford, 1965, pp. 170-171. [Back
to Text] |